Die Militärgespräche, aus deutscher Sicht schon vor 1914 "Beweis" der Einkreisung, sind mit der Initialzündung Marokko-Krise verbunden. Ob sie auch ohne stattgefunden hätten, ist Spekulation. Immerhin gab es - nicht verwunderlich, wenn man sich mit der Innensicht der britischen Army und des relativ jungen General Staff beschäftigt, der umtriebig nach Aufgaben "suchte" - Personenkreise in der Army, die das aktiv betrieben. Die Politik ließ das - vor 1911 als "Antwerpen-Fall" behandelt - zu, auch im Rahmen der politischen Grundsatzlinie, sich von Frankreich nicht auf Bündniszusagen festnageln zu lassen. Zusammenfassend Elizabeth Greenhalgh: Victory through Coalition - Britain and France during the First World War "Significantly, it was German action that inspired the talks between British and French general staffs. They began after the Moroccan crisis of 1905 and were instigated by the French who were anxious to know whether Britain would support France if it came to a Franco-German war. The French Ambassador put the question formally in January 1906 to Sir Edward Grey, who noted: ‘It was inevitable that the French should ask the question; it was impossible that we should answer it.’ The first staff talks seem to have taken place in secret during December 1905 between the French military attache ́ in London, Colonel Huguet, and the Director of Military Operations at the War Office, General Grierson. The same month the permanent secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence communicated some questions about French intentions to the French General Staff via Colonel Charles a` Court Repington, the military correspondent of The Times. A later DMO, the Francophile Sir Henry Wilson, pushed forwards detailed planning for the intervention of a British force on the continent. This planning was committed to paper at the height of the Agadir crisis in July 1911, despite Asquith’s qualification of military talks as ‘rather dangerous’. The question of Belgian neutrality was discussed the following year and a warning given that the French should not violate it. This warning led to the French Plan XVII’s failure to undertake offensive action in the one area where it might have interfered with the German advance. On the other side of the balance sheet, it should be admitted that without the violation of Belgian neutrality it may not have been possible to persuade the British cabinet to opt for war at all. The naval talks began slightly later. One of the architects of the Entente cordiale who had become naval minister in 1911, The ́ophile Delcasse ́, was astounded to find that there were no equivalent naval arrangements to compare with those of the army. The earlier decisions on the part of the French to concentrate in the Mediterranean and on the part of Admiral Fisher to concentrate British naval power in the North Sea in order to counter the German threat suited both parties but implied no obligations. Desultory talks during 1911 were interrupted the following year by Lord Haldane’s mission to Berlin to attempt some reconciliation of the Anglo-German naval race. The failure of that mission led to the realisa- tion that a more formal agreement was needed between the Royal and French navies. Ratification of the strategies guiding the disposition of both fleets came in 1913 and had the double result of confirming British dependence on the French in the Mediterranean and of granting a hostage to fortune in that some could now argue that the Royal Navy had a moral commitment to defend the coasts of northern France. (Any such ‘moral’ commitment takes no account of the fact that Britain could not afford to allow any aggressive German presence in the North Sea or English Channel.) Although these military and naval arrangements were settled and epitomised by the Grey–Cambon exchange of letters in 1912, there was no British commitment to intervene on the side of France in the event of a European war. "